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Introduction 
Over the past few years political participation of minorities has been increasing (Berger et al., 
2000; Bird, Saalfeld & Wüst, 2011a, p. 2). When these groups participate, they generally vote 
for social-democratic parties as they have been more open to immigrants (Bloemraad & 
Schönwälder, 2013, p. 571). For example, the British case showed that Asian and Black 
immigrants are strong supporters of the Labour party (Anwar, 2001). The Norwegian case 
showed a tendency of immigrants to vote for left-of-center parties, where they looked at an 
aggregated group of immigrants coming from Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America 
Abstract 
European states are growing increasingly ethnically diverse due to international migration.  
Political research generally shows that immigrants vote for left-wing parties, but studies on 
party identification of immigrants and immigrant voting behavior in Germany, Switzerland 
and the United States show that this is not the case for immigrants from former communist 
countries. Expecting that experience with a communist regime has shaped the political 
preferences of CEE immigrants towards right-wing parties, data from the European Social 
Survey is  used to perform a quantitative analysis with data on immigrant respondents from 
sixteen European countries. First results show that CEE immigrants indeed vote more for 
right-wing parties than other immigrants. The logistic regression shows that CEE ancestry 
has a positive and significant effect on voting for right-wing parties, compared to other 
immigrants and controlling for gender, age, class and religiosity. However, these results 
seem to mostly rely on respondents from Israel. When this case is excluded the hypothesis 
cannot be supported for the European continent. Further research is needed to see whether 
the reasons of migration from (former) communist states have influenced the left-right 
voting preferences.   
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(Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011). Research on the local voting behavior of immigrants in the 
Netherlands originating from Turkey, Surinam or Morocco also showed that immigrants vote 
mainly for leftist parties (Michon & Tillie, 2011, p. 76-77). Yet, empirical research in Germany 
showed that Eastern European resettlers strongly support the Christian-Democratic party while 
citizens from Turkish origin preferred the SPD and Greens (Wüst, 2011, p. 91-93). A more 
general research of Just on party identification showed that immigrants from communist 
countries are less likely to identify with left-wing parties in their host countries compared to 
immigrants from noncommunist countries (2019, p. 675). Outside of the European context it 
has been found that Cuban Americans, also having experienced a communist regime, have 
voted overwhelmingly for the Republican presidential candidate Reagan (Moreno & Wyatt, 
2015, p. 254). These findings imply that there might be a difference in voting behavior among 
different immigrant groups. As there apparently is a lacuna in political research on this topic, it 
is important to look more into detail at the voting behavior of immigrants. The central argument 
of this study is that the legacy of communism shapes voters’ party preferences in Western-
Europe. This is interesting in the context of the current influx of migrants in Europe and possible 
EU enlargement with former communist states, but hopefully also tells us something about the 
legacy of communism.  
Therefore my research question is: To what extent and why do immigrants from former 
communist countries vote differently from other migrants? 
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Background 
International migration has become a major phenomenon worldwide (Penninx, Kraal, 
Martiniello & Vertovec, 2016, p. 1), which caused states to grow increasingly ethnically diverse 
(Bird et al., 2011a, p. 1). Since World War II, three specific phenomena affected international 
migration patterns in Europe: labor shortages, decolonization and the collapse of communism 
(Jennissen, 2004, p. 1). After the Second World War, most Northern and European countries 
had to recover and experienced huge economic growth, which led to a high demand for manual 
labor. However, the domestic labor force was not sufficient. While most labor migrants came 
from Southern Europe in the sixties, the geographical origin of labor migrants shifted to Turkey 
and the Maghreb (Jennissen, 2004, p. 14-15). When the demand for foreign labor decreased in 
the seventies, many Northern and European countries imposed immigration restrictions 
(Jennissen, 2004, p. 16). Most Southern European labor forces returned to their country of 
origin, but others, mostly from Turkish and Northern African descent, decided to bring their 
families (Bonifazi, 2008, p. 116; Jennissen, 2004, p. 16). The second factor, decolonization, led 
to a bigger diversification of the European continent as immigrants from non-European and 
non-Mediterranean countries arrived on a large scale (Bonifazi, 2008, p. 115). Not only 
European resettlers returned, but the colonial links were also the basis of flows for the native 
populations of these countries. They faced a tolerant regulatory framework, as the colonial 
powers did not want to lose the links to their former colonies (Bonifazi, 2008, p. 115).  
After the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) Western 
European governments expected a big flow of migration from East to West because of the 
differences in affluence (Engbersen, Okólski, Black, & Panţîru, 2010, p. 7). However, due to 
their restrictive immigration policies since 1989 this flow of immigration did not occur 
(Engbersen et al., 2010, p. 7-8). In the beginning of 1990s opportunities for regular labor 
migration also remained very limited, while there was considerable irregular migration due to 
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specific programmes to facilitate temporary labor migration. Most migrants from the former 
USSR migrated however within the area (Engbersen et al., 2010, p. 9). This started to change 
throughout the 1990s when certain Western European Union states started to relax their 
restrictive admission rules by granting people from CEE countries access to travel in the 
Schengen Area. Southern European governments increasingly tolerated irregular residence by 
Eastern Europeans (Engbersen et al., 2010, p. 9). The biggest flow of migration came from 
Romania and Bulgaria where emigration pressure had built up under communism as these 
citizens experienced strict controls on exit (Engbersen et al., 2010, p. 9). The accession of eight 
CEE states to the European Union in 2004 gave a new impulse to migration from Eastern to 
Western Europe (Engbersen et al., 2010, p. 10). While Ireland, Sweden, the UK and non-EU 
member Norway opened their labor markets immediately, other countries implemented 
conditions on labor migration as part of a transition period. Since then migration from CEE 
states to Western Europe has become more common. At the moment several Western Balkan 
countries have applied for EU membership or are potential candidate countries, which might 
lead to increasing migration flows from CEE countries to Western Europe in the future. In short, 
we have seen three important flows of migration to Western Europe since World War II: labor 
migration from the Mediterranean area, immigrants from former colonies and people from 
Central and Eastern Europe.  
However, this story does not apply to the Israel case which is also part of this study. 
Israel is not only geographically located differently and has another course of history than the 
European continent, but it is also a Jewish state with immigration policies that are very open to 
Jews. This caused mass migration that can be defined in two waves: the first wave came from 
Europe after the Holocaust, the second wave came from the USSR and Ethiopia (Hacohen, 
2003, p. 252-253). Many immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe have migrated to Israel 
for religious reasons as there was no place for religion in general but also a lot of anti-Semitism 
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in the Soviet-Union (Ro’i, 1995, p. 9). These Jewish migrants immediately received Israeli 
citizenship which allowed them to vote (Fassman & Münz, 1994, p. 526), which differs from 
other European countries where many CEE immigrants were not allowed to vote at the national 
elections as they did not automatically receive citizenship. These factors make Israel a special 
case in this study.  
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Theoretical framework 
In the literature on the political participation of minorities there are two approaches: the class-
based approach and the ethnic approach (Bird et al., 2011a, p. 10-11; Otjes & Krouwel, 2019, 
p. 1150). The class-based approach argues that socio-economic status determines the voting 
behavior of minorities (Bird et al., 2011a, p. 10-11). As these groups have a relatively low 
position in the labor market and thus have a lower socio-economic status, they tend to vote 
social-democratic. The ethnic approach supposes that ethnicity, religion or culture shape the 
political culture of groups and structure their voting behavior along these lines (Bird et al., 
2011a, p. 10). Because these independent variables differ among immigrant groups, it could be 
a way to explain why different groups vote for different parties. This approach also 
encompasses the notion of the ‘racial utility heuristic’, which means that migrant voters tend to 
vote for candidates with the same ethnicity because the ethnicity acts as a heuristic for a 
candidate’s representativeness (Otjes & Krouwel, 2019, p. 1150). Yet, it is the class-based 
approach that mainly explains why immigrants vote social-democratic (left) as they generally 
come from a lower economic class (Bird et al., 2011a, p. 11).  
Both these approaches are not sufficient for explaining deviant empirical cases (Bishin 
& Klofstad, 2012, p. 586; Wüst, 2000, p. 564). A study on party preferences of naturalized 
German citizens from Eastern-Europe and naturalized citizens from Turkey showed that blue-
collar workers from Eastern-Europe were very supportive of the CDU (Christian Democratic 
Union), while blue-collar workers from Turkey preferred the SPD (Social Democratic Party) 
(Wüst, 2000, p. 564). This means that the class-based approach is not sufficient to explain the 
voting behavior of citizens who emigrated from former communist states. Another study on 
Cuban Americans found that despite sharing similar culture, religious, social and linguistic 
backgrounds, Cuban Americans are distinctive among Latinos by supporting the Republican 
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Party (Bishin & Klofstad, 2012, p. 586). The ethnic approach is thus not sufficient to explain 
voting behavior of these citizens, who also emigrated from a communist state.  
I argue that there is a third approach that can explain voting behavior of immigrants: the 
communist-regime-experience approach. This approach supposes that experience with a 
communist regime creates anti-communist sentiments which lead to a negative identification 
with left-wing parties. Communist regimes have a far-left ideology because of their reliance on 
the centralized command economy (Just, 2019, p. 659). They generate a negative reaction in 
the mass publics because of the party control, economic inefficiencies and diminished 
opportunities for citizens to ensure livelihood outside the party’s patronage system (Just, 2019, 
p. 659). This negative reaction manifests itself in right-wing political views by immigrants from 
communist countries. Next to this, early experiences in people’s lives shape their political 
orientation and these views tend to persist over time as people reject views that contradict theirs 
(Just, 2019, p. 652). Thus when individuals have decided to leave their home country, their 
fundamental political orientations structured by early political experiences persist in their host 
country (Bilodeau, 2014, p. 374). Following, parents socialize this to their offspring (Strijbis, 
2014, p. 615-616). Also, groups feel connected to political parties based on their political roles 
during important political events or conflicts (Strijbis, 2014, p. 615), like communism versus 
capitalism. Therefore CEE immigrants have a negative identification with left-wing parties in 
their host country which are associated with the repressive communist regime. 
Several empirical studies point at this mechanism where experience with a communist 
regime creates anti-communist sentiments which lead to a negative identification with left-wing 
parties and thus a voting preference for right-wing parties (Heyns & Bialecki, 1991; Just, 2019; 
Moreno & Wyatt, 2015, Strijbis, 2014; Tavits & Letki, 2009; Wüst 2011). Anti-communist 
sentiments do not only encompass negative feelings towards the old privileged regime, but also 
refers to a set of ethical beliefs about the political and economic system, for example that people 
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have certain individual rights (Appel, 2005, p. 380). First of all, signs of this mechanism were 
found in post-communist countries themselves: the Polish election in the summer of 1989 
turned out to be a great defeat for the Communist Party, as the party that opposed the communist 
regime overwhelmingly won the elections (Heyns & Bialecki, 1991, p. 351, 354). Even when 
the leaders of the eventually winning party acknowledged that they were not prepared nor able 
to rule the country, voters did not see this as an impediment to support them. This case shows 
that anti-communist sentiments are important for shaping political preferences (Heyns & 
Bialecki, 1991, p. 361, 365). Another study on transitioning post-communist countries showed 
that reformed communist parties enjoyed the loyalty of their members from before the regime 
change, but that right-wing parties were seen as ideologically suitable for the new regime by 
their voters as these parties opposed the communist regime (Tavits & Letki, 2009, p. 557). So 
it were the sentiments against the old communist regime that made citizens vote for the right 
and not the left. 
Empirical studies on party preferences of immigrants from (former) communist states 
point at the same mechanism (Just, 2019; Moreno & Wyatt, 2015, Strijbis, 2014). A study on 
immigrant voting behavior in Switzerland showed that immigrants who lived under 
communism have anti-communist sentiments and manifest themselves in a negative 
identification with socialist parties (Strijbis, 2014, p. 616, 623). This result was different from 
the other two migrant groups, guest workers from Southern Europe and outgroups (Muslims, 
Sub-Saharan Africans, Turkey and other asylum seekers), which preferred left-wing parties.  
Research on Cuban Americans showed that this group was politically mobilized by the anti-
communist rhetoric of Republican presidential candidate Reagan (Moreno & Wyatt, 2015, p. 
254). To be more specific, the group of Cuban Americans who fled Castro’s Cuba in 1980 when 
he temporarily allowed all those who wanted to leave Cuba to do so, exhibit the most 
Republican attitudes (Bishin & Klofstad, 2012, p. 588, 591). The facts that (1) these people are 
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political refugees, thus having negative experiences with the communist regime, and (2) 
supported the Republican party, a more conservative party with an anti-communist position, 
suggest that their experience with the communist regime motivated them to vote for that certain 
party. A very recent study on party identification by Just showed that political regimes in 
migrants’ home countries play a role in their attachment to parties in their host countries (2019, 
p. 672). Immigrants born in communist countries are specifically unlikely to identify with left-
wing parties in the host country as a reaction to the far-left ideology of their home country’s 
autocracy (Just, 2019, p. 675). These studies show that people who have experienced a 
communist regime vote differently from what is expected by the general voting theories on 
immigrant voting behavior (Wüst, 2011, p. 91-93). Therefore, I propose the communist-regime-
experience approach as an explanation.  
Hence, I want to test the following hypothesis: 
I – Immigrants from former communist countries tend to favor right-wing parties more than 
immigrants from non-communist countries. 
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Data and Measures 
I test my hypothesis by means of a quantitative research on voting behavior by using individual-
level data collected by the European Social Survey (ESS) in Round 7 (2014a) and Round 8 
(2016a). This survey is well known for its high standards in cross-national survey data 
(Kittilson, 2009, p. 32) and includes information on national elections, ancestry and other 
personal information like gender or age. There have been some country specific researches on 
different immigrant groups (Wüst, 2011; Strijbis, 2014), but with this study I want to be able to 
observe a more general trend that solidifies the outcomes. Also, as the respondents of the ESS 
are a sample of national populations, not many of them qualify as immigrant. Having 
respondents from multiple countries increases the number of immigrant-respondents in my 
sample and that increases the feasibility of the study. Therefore I will look at several ESS 
countries. There are 32 countries available in the ESS, but for two reasons only 16 of them are 
selected: first, because the focus of the study is on immigrants who emigrated from CEE 
countries to Western European democracies, all CEE countries are excluded. This includes 
Germany because of the former division in East- and West-Germany. Second, because the 
variable ‘ancestry’ (see the paragraph on variables for more information) is only incorporated 
in Round 7 (2014a) and Round 8 (2016a) of the ESS, all countries that are not included in these 
rounds, are excluded from the study as well. Therefore respondents from sixteen ESS countries 
are included in the dataset: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel1, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. 
Dependent Variable 
As voting behavior in terms of left and right parties is my dependent variable, I rely on the 
question ‘Party voted for in last election in [survey country]’. I have chosen to use voting 
                                                          
1 Formally located in Western Asia 
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behavior instead of party affiliation as dependent variable because by voting immigrants 
influence parliaments, government and in the end policy in Western Europe (Bird, Saalfeld & 
Wüst, 2011b, p. 66). Predictors of party choice, such as party affiliation are interesting 
antecedents (Just, 2019), but vote choice is the most direct way to see the influence of 
immigrants. This way I try to improve my contribution to the greater body of research.  
All parties that respondents could vote for in their survey country, will first be recoded 
into the dichotomous variable left [0] and right [1]. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) is 
used to code them in general terms of left/right (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al. 2017). This 
means that in my study all parties from the center-right to extreme right are addressed as ‘right-
wing’, and vice versa for the left. Parties were coded as right when they scored higher than a 5 
on the 0-10 left-right continuum. As the CHES does not include information on every single 
existing party and also does not include survey countries Iceland and Israel, the Manifesto 
Project was used to complete missing information on the left/right position of parties (Krause 
et al., 2018). Parties were coded as right if they scored positive on the left-right continuum 
(Dinas & Gemenis, 2009, p. 429; Krause et al., 2018). In case these two sources were not 
sufficient, the ESS appendix A3 of Round 7 (2014b) or the ESS appendix A3 of Round 8 
(2016b) provided for some survey countries’ parties comments on their left/right stance, so this 
information was used as an additional source. Only for parties from Northern Ireland and Israel 
another study was sometimes needed: Party Politics in Modern Democracies by Benoit and 
Laver (2006). In the rare occasion there was still information missing on a party, other 
individual articles have been used to fill the gaps. See the Appendix for the left/right party 
classification per country.  
Independent Variable 
In order to identify the respondents who are from CEE countries and the respondent who are 
immigrants from other areas than Central and Eastern Europe, I used the ESS question ‘How 
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would you describe your ancestry?’. Respondents were allowed to choose two ancestries. There 
are 454 options for first ancestry, and 455 for second ancestry as the option ‘no second ancestry’ 
has been added to the second list. Based on the answers given by the respondents, I constructed 
three groups of respondents. The first group of respondents consists of all individuals who do 
not have a migration background. For example, when a respondent is from survey country 
Austria, I only coded them [1] for being native, if both ancestries are Austrian. This means it is 
a double condition. If individuals have a mixed background, I give them a [0] on the variable 
‘native’. The reason for this is that I want this variable to include only respondents of whom I 
can be certain that they are socialized in/by their survey country. The second group consists of 
respondent who have CEE ancestry.2 I marked a respondent as CEE immigrant if one of the 
two ancestries is Eastern European. All people who said not to be native or CEE, are part of the 
third category consisting of other immigrants.3 When a respondent has chosen not to answer 
the ancestry question I excluded them from all groups. When a respondent has chosen a first 
ancestry (which was not CEE) but refused to give their second ancestry or did not know their 
second, they were also not included as I had no certainty on where to categorize them. This way 
I have tried to prevent that people are categorized into possibly the wrong category. Only when 
I could be certain that the respondent should be in one of the categories, they were included. 
Because I am testing whether CEE immigrants vote differently from other immigrants, CEE 
ancestry is my most important independent variable. Table 1 presents an overview of the three 
                                                          
2 The numbers 14000-15990 are corresponding with migrants coming from Central and Eastern Europe. When 
they only have one ancestry, the second option will have the code ‘no second ancestry’ or ‘no answer’. In order 
to include everyone with a CEE background, respondents who only have one of the two ancestry choices as 
CEE, will be included.  
3 Respondents who have combined an ancestry code corresponding with the survey country with an ancestry 
code that is not corresponding with the survey country, are also categorized in this immigrant category. 
However, if one of the choices is a CEE code, they will be in the CEE category. 
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categories per survey country. Because I am looking at voting behaviour, I only selected the 
cases where the respondents have actually voted in their survey country.  
Table 1: Respondents that voted categorized by ancestry group per country 
Country CEE immigrants Other immigrants Natives 
Austria 127 126 2132 
Belgium 30 417 2020 
Denmark* 8 53 1098 
Finland 19 32 2637 
France 20 436 1556 
Iceland* 7 121 546 
Ireland 17 256 2567 
Israel 139 1017 2496 
Italy* 9 29 876 
Netherlands, the 17 195 2290 
Norway 0 333 1873 
Portugal 5 125 1095 
Spain 4 249 1883 
Sweden 36 319 2302 
Switzerland 29 237 1079 
United Kingdom 31 375 2170 
Total 498 4320 28620 
*Only ESS Round 7 or 8 available 
 
 
Control variables 
I will control for the following factors: gender, age, class and religiosity. For gender there are 
two options, male and female. It should be checked that the outcome is not caused by the fact 
that mainly males voted, who nowadays have a higher preference of right parties than women 
(Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014, p. 330). Also, women have generally been less politically 
active than men (Just, 2019, p. 665). I will check for age as well because political engagement 
increases with age (Just, 2019, p. 665) and there is a difference in voting preferences among 
generations (Abendschön & Steinmetz, 2014, p. 317). In my dataset the average age is 48,06 
years. The factor age has been calculated by the ESS based on year of birth. Because there is 
no question on class incorporated in the ESS, I relied on the class scheme made by Daniel Oesch 
(2006). He allocated individuals in a 16, 8 or 5 class schema, based on the information they 
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gave when answering ESS questions on employments status, the number of employees and 
occupational title. When a respondent had missing information on these questions, the answers 
they have given on these questions about their partner’s employment have been used to 
determine their class. After having applied the 5-schema to the individual data, I recoded this 
scheme to a 2-schema, divided in working class [1] and middle/higher class [0] based on the 5-
scheme of Oesch which calls two of the five categories ‘working class’. As the class-based 
approach expects that lower classes generally vote for left-wing parties (Bird et al., 2011a, p. 
10-11), this variable is supposed to control that it is not class instead of ancestry that accounts 
for the value of the dependent variable. When checking for religiosity, I rely on the question 
‘How religious are you?’. A scale from 0 through 10 is used for answering this question, where 
0 stands for ‘not religious at all’ and 10 represents ‘very religious’. Checking for religiosity is 
important, because it may influence voting behavior in two ways: first, being religious may 
foster more charitable feelings towards the poor which might raise support for left-wing parties 
(Dancygier & Saunders, 2006, p. 970). Second, the religious cleavage may increase the support 
for Christian Democratic parties (Van der Brug, Hobolt & de Vreese, 2009, p. 1274). As 
religion has become more important in Eastern Europe after the fall of the suppressing 
communist regime (Müller & Neundorf, 2012, p. 559), this factor should be taken into account 
when explaining voting behavior. 
Table 2: Descriptives of the independent variables 
 
 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptives of the independent variables for the sample consisting of CEE 
and other immigrants who voted for a left- or right-wing party, because I study that group of 
respondents. In order to be able to compare my independent variables, I have divided the 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CEE ancestry 4697 0 1 0,10  0,303 
Male 4696 0 1 0,47  0,499 
Age 4681 18 93 48,06  17,092 
Working Class 4432 0 1 0,47  0,499 
Religiosity 4671 0 1 0,491  0,324 
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religiosity variable by ten in my dataset, so the scale is from 0 to 1 (with steps of 0,1) as the 
other variables (except for age) are of the same size.  
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Analysis and Results 
In this section I will first check for anti-communist sentiments among CEE immigrants, 
followed by a cross tabulation which is an easy way to analyze and compare the results of the 
different aggregated ancestry groups. After these first results a logistic regression will be used 
to explain the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
Anti-communist sentiments 
Before testing the hypothesis, I briefly checked whether CEE respondents have anti-communist 
sentiments. I used a proxy variable for anti-communist sentiments based on answers to a ESS 
question where people had to respond whether the statement is applicable to them or not. I used 
the following statement: ‘Important to make own decisions and be free’. Respondents had to 
place themselves on a scale from 1 to 6, where 1 stands for ‘very much like me’ and 6 for ‘not 
like me at all’, where the tipping point is at 4 (a little like me) and 5 (not like me). Table 3 
shows the results for respondents from the different ancestries that have voted: CEE immigrants 
indeed have a lower mean than the other ancestries on the proxy variable.  
Table 3: Compare means of proxy variable anti-communist sentiment 
Ancestry Mean N Std. Deviation 
CEE immigrants 1,97 481 1,095 
Other immigrants 2,08 4146 1,103 
Natives 2,14 27652 1,103 
Following, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect of ancestry on anti-
communist sentiments. There was a significant effect of ancestry on the proxy variable on the 
p<0,1 level for the three conditions [F(2, 32276)=14,958, p=0,000]. Post hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the CEE ancestry condition (M=1,97, 
SD=1,095) was significantly different than the other immigrant condition (M=2,08, SD=1,103) 
and native condition (M=2,14, SD=1,103). These results suggest that CEE immigrants do 
experience (more) anti-communist sentiments.  
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Cross tabulation 
Table 4 presents the relationship between ancestry and left-right party voting among the 
respondents. Country-specific tables can be found in the Appendix. The number of respondents 
Table 4. The relationship between ancestry and left-right party voting 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrants Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 52,1% 57,3% 43,1% 45,1% 
Right 47,9% 42,7% 56,9% 54,9% 
Total     482 4215 27.869 32.566 
Note: Pearson Chi-Square is 319,447 (df=2) 
that have voted in national elections in Table 1 is higher than in Table 4, where these 
respondents are subcategorized into left-wing party voters and right-wing party voters. The 
reason for this is that some national parties were unable to be categorized because they are in 
the perfect center (Kulanu in Israel), have not taken a left-right position (the Independents in 
the UK) or are missing from the dataset due to a lack of information on their left-right position 
(Political Women’s Group in Switzerland).4 When interpreting Table 4, several things stand 
out. First of all, a distinction can be made between all immigrants and natives: immigrants 
altogether generally vote more for left-wing parties than natives do. However, when comparing 
the two immigrants groups with each other, other immigrants have relatively voted more for a 
left-wing party than CEE immigrants have. What this means for the hypothesis is that CEE 
immigrants indeed seem to favor right-wing parties more than other immigrants, because we 
see in Table 4 that 47,9% of the CEE immigrants voted for a right-wing party compared to 
42,7% of the other immigrants. Put differently, if one has to draw a line from left to right and 
place the three aggregated ancestry categories on that line, other immigrants would be on the 
left side, the natives on the right side and the CEE immigrants in between while still being on 
the left side of the spectrum.  
                                                          
4 See the Appendix for the party-categorization per survey country.  
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Logistic Regression  
Given the fact that my dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic regression will follow to 
describe the relationship between my dependent and independent variables. Table 5 reports the 
results, where each table represents the regression coefficient B and their standard error in 
parentheses. There are six different models: Model 1 looks at the relationship between CEE 
ancestry and right-wing voting, Model 2 includes the control variables, Model 3 is similar to 
Model 2 except that Israel is excluded, Model 4 only looks at Israel and Model 5 and 6 check 
for country-fixed effects for all respondents, where Israel is excluded from the sample in Model 
6. The sample used for the models only consist of the respondents who belong to the ancestry 
category ‘CEE immigrants’ or ‘other immigrants’, because testing the hypothesis requires the 
comparison of these two groups. This means that the outcome of the variable ‘CEE immigrant’ 
has to be interpreted against the variable ‘other immigrants’. When interpreting the results I 
will use the exponentiation of the B coefficients as they provide more information on the effect 
a covariate has on the dependent variable: it allows to speak in terms of increased likelihood to 
vote for a right-wing party.  
Interpretation of the different models 
Model 1 in Table 5 looks at the relationship between the dependent variable and CEE ancestry, 
not taking any other variables into account. When a respondent has CEE ancestry, it is 23% 
more likely that they vote for a right-wing party than an immigrant with another ancestry and 
this result is significant with a confidence interval of 90%. To clarify, this does not mean that 
CEE immigrants vote for right parties in general, but that they are more likely to vote for a 
right-wing party than other immigrants. Without checking for other possible explanations, 
Model 1 supports the hypothesis that CEE immigrants are more likely to vote for a right-wing 
party than other immigrants. However, other factors might also contribute to voting behavior 
as described in the paragraph on control variables.  
19 
 
 
Table 5: Logistic regression analysis of voting for right-wing parties 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
All countries All countries All countries, 
Israel excluded 
Israel All countries All countries, 
Israel excluded 
(Constant) -0,293*** -0,853*** -0,617*** -2,195*** -1.450*** -1,292*** 
 (0,031) (0,114) (0,129) (0,274) (0,160) (0,170) 
CEE ancestry 0,210* 0,195* -0,110 1,592*** 0,372** 0,021 
 (0,096) (0,100) (0,116) (0,226) (0,109) (0,129) 
Male  0,135* 0,193** -0,132 0,128* 0,183* 
  (0,062) (0,070) (0,137) (0,063) (0,071) 
Age  0,011*** 0,010*** 0,016*** 0,011*** 0,010*** 
  (0,002) (0,002) (0,004) (0,002) (0,002) 
Working Class  -0,255*** -0,350*** 0,141 -0,242*** -0,341*** 
  (0,062) (0,070) (0,137) (0,063) (0,072) 
Religiosity  0,222* 0,093 1,459*** 0,314** 0,140 
    (0,096) (0,110) (-0,235) (0,100) (0,115) 
Country fixed effects 
(baseline=UK)       
  Austria     0,144 0,323* 
     (0,181) (0,183) 
  Belgium     0,493** 0,515** 
     (0,151) (0,151) 
  Denmark     0,174 0,193 
     (0,309) (0,308) 
  Finland     0,591* 0,719* 
     (0,316) (0,315) 
  France     0,382* 0,385* 
     (0,149) (0,149) 
  Iceland     0,988*** 0,967*** 
     (0,217) (0,217) 
  Ireland     1,244*** 1,243*** 
     (0,179) (0,179) 
  Israel     0,325*  
     (0,129)  
  Italy     -0,407 -0,320 
     (0,405) (0,405) 
  The Netherlands     0,646*** 0,665*** 
     (0,178) (0,178) 
  Norway     0,891*** 0,837*** 
     (0,158) (0,158) 
  Portugal     0,622** 0,615** 
     (0,214) (0,214) 
  Spain     0,921*** 0,897*** 
     (0,171) (0,172) 
  Sweden     0,445** 0,432** 
     (0,157) (0,157) 
  Switzerland     1,272*** 1,271*** 
     (0,174) (0,170) 
-2LL  6421,127 5959,741 4638,990 1231,029 5825,168 4527,372 
Cox and Snell's R2 0,001 0,015 0,017 0,081 0,045 0,049 
Nagelkerke R2 0,001 0,021 0,023 0,110 0,060 0,066 
N 4697 4396 3410 986 4396 3410 
Note: binary logistical regression with standard errors in parentheses.  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,01, *p < 0,1 
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Model 2 incorporates the control variables gender, age, class and religiosity. As the 
LogLikelihood has decreased in Model 2, this model appears to be better suitable for explaining 
the outcome of the dependent variable. But despite the increase of the pseudo R-squared values 
of the second model, the values are still quite low. When I added the control variables the results 
are still consistent with my hypothesis: CEE immigrants are 22% more likely to vote for a right-
wing party than other immigrants and this result is significant. Besides the likelihood, the b-
coefficient and standard error of the CEE ancestry variable are also roughly the same for both 
models. This shows that the discovered effect of ancestry on the dependent variable seems 
stable when adding other variables.  
 The control variables are all significant and contribute to the outcome of the dependent 
variable. Checking for gender, men are 15% more likely to vote for a right-wing party than 
women. According to Inglehart and Norris women place themselves in general further to the 
left than men do (2003, p. 86). They argue that the entry of women into the workforce could 
explain why they vote more to the left, but also that a cleavage of new values where the left 
stands for women’s rights and environment, attracts female voters (Inglehart & Norris, 2003, 
p. 89). Next to this, women display stronger support for government spending on welfare and 
public services than men do, which are leftist policies. These possible explanations could 
contribute to the fact that men are more likely to vote for right-wing parties, as shown by Model 
2. The influence of age is also significant, but very limited: every increase of one year in age 
means that the likelihood of voting for a right-wing party increases with 1%. The effect of being 
in working class seems to be a lot bigger, as it decreases the likelihood of voting for a right-
wing party with 23%. This is in line with the earlier mentioned class-based approach for 
understanding (immigrant) voting behavior. However, despite the effect of working class on 
voting behavior, the variable on ancestry is significant and also has a comparable effect (22%). 
This confirms that the class-based approach is not sufficient and that there is something to say 
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for the communist-regime-experience approach. The final control variable is religiosity, which 
is categorical. This means that with an increment of 0,1 on the 0 to 1 religiosity scale, it becomes 
25% more likely that a respondent has voted for a right-wing party. This is one of the three 
variables next to CEE ancestry and working class that has the biggest effect on the dependent 
variable. Other research also found that citizens who belong to a religious group are generally 
more likely to vote for a center-right party, Christian Democratic parties in particular (Van der 
Brug et al., 2009, p.  1278). In the Appendix Christian Democratic parties indeed are coded as 
right-wing.  
Furthermore, I checked for the country Israel, as that country has the most CEE 
respondents (see Table 1) which makes the outcomes rely a lot on this group. Next to this, Israel 
is a special case compared to the other countries as mentioned in the background section. In my 
dataset 8% of the CEE immigrants in Israel cast a vote in the national election, while the average 
for the Western European countries is 1%. Because Israel is such a different case, the 
independent variables might have a different effect on the dependent variable when Israel is 
excluded. Model 3 in Table 5 shows the results for excluding Israel. The biggest change is that 
of the hypothesized independent variable: having CEE ancestry is no longer significant and 
now has a negative effect on right-wing voting as the likelihood decreases with 10%. A possible 
explanation for this changed result could be that as CEE immigrants who went to Western 
Europe were economically motivated, it is class that shaped their voting preferences. Model 3 
shows that working class reduces the likelihood of voting for a right-wing party by 30% and 
this effect is significant. Model 3 does not support the hypothesis, but confirms the class-based 
approach.  
When I only use the respondents from Israel in the regression analysis (Model 4), who 
mainly migrated for religious reasons, CEE ancestry is extremely significant and has a positive 
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effect compared to other immigrants.5 Immigrants from communist states might not prefer left-
wing parties in Israel as they associate them with the religious repression of the communist 
regime. Obviously the N is too low for making certain statements, but it does provide interesting 
information that could be developed further in the context of the influence of communism on 
voting preferences. The case of Israel does have something to say for the communist-regime-
experience approach, but maybe in a different (more religiously motivated) way than expected.  
I created Model 3 and Model 4 based on the high number of CEE respondents from 
Israel and the literature on migration to Western Europe and Israel. However, it is also possible 
to systemically check for country-fixed effects so that the CEE ancestry variable is no longer 
influenced by the structural differences between countries. This is done in Model 5 and Model 
6. Model 5 shows that when a respondent has CEE ancestry, it is 45% more likely that they 
vote for a right-wing party than an immigrant with another ancestry and that this result is 
significant. This effect is larger than in Model 2, because Model 2 was influenced by differences 
between countries. Model 5 supports the hypothesis. However, when respondents from Israel 
are excluded from the sample (Model 6) as was done in Model 3, the effect of CEE ancestry is 
not significant. Model 6 rejects the hypothesis just like Model 3 but confirms the class-based 
approach. An outlier made it look like the hypothesis was true.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 With and without control variables the effect was positive and significant.  
23 
 
Conclusion and discussion 
This study aimed to understand to what extent and why immigrants from former communist 
Central and Eastern Europe vote differently than other immigrants. Not only is there a lacuna 
in research on voting behavior among different immigrant groups, but it is also interesting for 
predicting future voting trends, as immigration is still a hot topic.  
In this study I examined the communist-regime-experience approach for explaining 
immigrant voting behavior. This approach supposes that citizens take their political orientations 
from their home country to their host country and that a repressive communist regime creates 
anti-communist sentiments, leading to an aversion of Western European left-wing parties. The 
quantitative analysis showed that CEE immigrants indeed favor right-wing parties more than 
other immigrants do, so the view that all immigrants mainly vote left-wing is incorrect. There 
is an actual difference found between ancestry groups. The communist-regime-experience 
approach seems to complement the class-based approach as an explanation for this finding. 
However, the significant relationship between CEE ancestry and right-wing voting disappeared 
when respondents from Israel were excluded. This exclusion confirmed the class-based 
approach and showed no support for the hypothesis for Western Europe. However, it did  
suggest that the communist-regime-experience approach plays a role for religiously motivated 
immigrants from CEE countries when looking at Israel. It seems to be the case that the reason 
for immigration from a communist state, being economically or religious, provides more insight 
on left-right voting behavior in the host country. More research should be done as only one case 
– Israel – has been tested, but it does provide an interesting perspective on immigrant voting 
behavior.  
 This research has some limitations that might have influenced the outcomes. First of all, 
the N could be higher. By using multiple European countries an attempt has been made to create 
an as large as possible group of respondents, but because of the differences in numbers between 
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countries, the results relied too much on certain countries. Also, respondents from other 
(former) communist states like Cuba or China could be included – too few were in this ESS 
sample to really increase the N. Next to this, the distinction between left and right parties could 
be done differently: maybe CEE immigrants did not vote for far-left parties because of their 
anti-communist sentiments, but did prefer center-left parties. That could mean that the 
experience with a communist regime does have an influence on voting behavior, but does not 
lead to a shift to right-wing parties, but to more moderate left ones. For future research it would 
be useful to conduct a survey only including immigrants and not filtering them from a sample 
that also includes natives. This would improve the amount of respondents and with that make 
the results less dependent on certain survey countries. Also, parties could be categorized 
differently: more shades of left and right, or looking at party affiliation instead of voting because 
many immigrants have not gained citizenship yet. This way it can provide for a possible future 
trend when they do gain citizenship and are able to vote in national elections. However, the aim 
of this study was to look at actual voting behavior because that has an influence on the policy 
of today.  
 Concluding, this study has actually confirmed that CEE immigrants favor right-wing 
parties more than other immigrants do, but also showed that the communist-regime-experience 
approach does not explain why this is the case for immigrants in Western Europe. However, I 
argue that experience with a communist regime cannot be ruled out completely as an 
explanation for voting behavior of immigrants – it only seems to be found at other places than 
expected.  
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Appendix  
This appendix presents the party data and the left-right voting behavior per ancestry in each of 
the 16 survey countries in alphabetical order. The party list is constituted by the answer options 
of the ESS questionnaire Round 7 and 8 combined. The left-right stance of these parties is coded 
mainly by using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). As 
mentioned in the chapter on data and measures, not all parties could be coded using this source. 
When other sources are used for the left-right coding this will be mentioned in the tables with 
a letter: (a) The Manifesto Project (Kraus et al., 2018) or (b) The Codebook of the European 
Social Survey Round 7 (2014b, p. 12, 31-32, 35, 39) or (c) The Codebook of the European 
Social Survey Round 8 (2016b, p. 13, 18, 22-24, 34-35, 41-42, 48). For the United Kingdom 
and Israel the categorization by Benoit and Laver (2006, p. 266, 277) has mainly been used to 
fill the gaps, marked with a (d). In the case of Israel, two centrist parties (Kulanu and Yesh 
Atid) got coded following Rahat, Hazan and Bloom (2016, p. 104, 107), marked as (e). When 
it comes to the Pirate Parties from Austria, Finland and Switzerland, these “[Pirate Parties have] 
an unwillingness to clarify the ideological position and the precise relationship between a 
libertarian freedom-related agenda and a social justice agenda” (Cammaerts, 2015, p. 19) and 
have therefore been coded as missing and got an (f). Other individual cases are seen in Norway 
(Sitter, 2006, p. 580) marked with a (g), Portugal (Jahn, Düpont, & Rachuj, 2018, p. 139) 
marked with an (h) and Spain (Morini, 2018, p. 424) marked with an (i). In case a party has 
been coded as missing but does have a source number, it means that according to the source it 
has no clear ideological stance. When it does not have a source number it means there is no 
academic information available. Independents are coded as missing because they are not 
affiliated with the left or right.  
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Austria 
Party Name  Stance 
Alliance for the Future of Austria R 
Austrian People’s Party R 
Communist Party of Austria L 
Freedom Party of Austria R 
NEOS—The New Austria R 
Pirate Party of Austria Missingf 
Social Democratic Party of Austria L 
Team Stronach for Austria R 
The Austrian Green Party L 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 62,7% 63,5% 47,9% 49,5% 
Right 37,3% 36,5% 52,1% 50,5% 
Total     126 126 1.106 1.199 
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Belgium 
Party Name  Stance 
Christian Democratic and Flemish R 
Ecologists L 
Flemish Interest R 
Green L 
Humanistic and Democratic Center L 
Labour Party (Flemish) L 
Labour Party (French) L 
List Dedecker R 
Mouvement Réformateur R 
National Front  R 
New Flemish Alliance R 
Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats R 
People's Party R 
Socialist Party L 
Socialist Party Different L 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 60,0% 58,5% 38,1% 41,8% 
Right 40,0% 41,5% 61,9% 58,2% 
Total     30 417 2.020 2.467 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Denmark 
Party Name  Stance 
Christian Democrats R 
Conservative People's Party R 
Danish People's Party L 
Danish Social Liberal Party R 
Liberal Alliance R 
Socialist People's Party L 
The Liberal Party R 
The Social Democrats L 
Unity List - The Red-Green Alliance L 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 87,5% 60,4% 50,5% 51,3% 
Right 12,5% 39,6% 49,5% 48,7% 
Total     8 53 1.096 1.159 
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Finland 
 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 52,6% 51,6% 33,7% 34,0% 
Right 47,4% 48,4% 66,3% 66,0% 
Total     19 31 2.614 2.664 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Party Name  Stance 
Change 2011 Rb 
Christian Democrats R 
Communist Party Lb 
For the Poor Missingb 
Freedom Party Finland's Future Rb 
Green League L 
Independence Party Rb 
Left Alliance L 
Pirate Party Missingf 
Senior Citizens' Party No votes 
Social Democratic Party L 
The Centre Party R 
The Communist Workers' Party for Peace and Socialism Lb 
The National Coalition Party R 
The Swedish People's Party of Finland R 
True Finns Party R 
Workers Party Lb 
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France 
Party Name  Stance 
Democrat Movement R 
Left Front L 
Left-Wing Radical Party L 
National Front R 
New Centre R 
Radical Party R 
Socialist Party  L 
The Greens L 
The Movement for France R 
The New Anticapitalist Party Lc 
Union for a Popular Movement R 
Worker's Fight L 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 60,0% 57,2% 46,8% 49,2% 
Right 40,0% 42,8% 53,2% 50,8% 
Total     20 428 1.529 1.977 
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Iceland 
Party Name  Stance 
Bright Future La 
Dawn La 
Households' Party No votes 
Humanist Party No votes 
Icelandic Nationalist Party No votes 
Party of the People Missing 
People's Front of Iceland Lc 
Pirate Party La 
Progressive Party La 
Reform Party La 
The Independence Party Ra 
The Left Green Movement La 
The Social Democratic Alliance La 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 42,9% 46,0% 59,7% 57,2% 
Right 57,1% 54,0% 40,3% 42,8% 
Total     7 113 534 654 
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Ireland 
Party Name  Stance 
Anti-Austerity Alliance - People Before Profit Alliance L 
Clan of the Irish People/Finn Gael R 
Green Party L 
Independent Missing 
Labour L 
We Ourselves/Sinn Féin L 
People Before Profit Alliance L 
Social Democrats La 
Socialist Party L 
Socialist Party - United Left Alliance La 
Soldiers of Destiny/Fianna Fáil R 
United Left Alliance La 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 38,5% 38,0% 27,1% 28,2% 
Right 61,5% 62,0% 72,9% 71,8% 
Total     13 213 2.093 2.319 
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Israel 
Party Name Party Name (English) Stance 
Ale Yarok Green Leaf Rc 
HaBayit HaYehudi The Jewish Home Rd 
HaMahane HaTzioni The Zionist Union Lc 
HaReshima HaArvit The Arab List Ld 
HaReshima HaMeshutefet The Joint List La 
Kulanu All of Us Missinge 
Likud National Liberal Movement Rc 
Meretz Vigour Lc 
Shas Torah-Observant Sephardim Rc 
Yachad Together Ld 
Yahadut HaTora United Torah Judaism Rc 
Yesh Atid There is Future Le 
Yisrael Beiteinu Israel our Home Ra 
Note: Because of translation difficulties with Hebrew both languages are incorporated 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 37,5% 67,0% 38,7% 46,7% 
Right 62,5% 33,0% 61,3% 53,3% 
Total     128 982 2.334 3.444 
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Italy 
Party Name  Stance 
Act to Stop the Decline Rc 
Brothers of Italy R 
Civic Choice R 
Civil Revolution Lc 
Democratic Party L 
Five Star Movement L 
Future and Freedom Rc 
Italian Radicals L 
Left Ecology Freedom L 
Northern League R 
The People of Freedom Rc 
The Right Rc 
Union of the Centre R 
 
 
     Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 66,7% 75,9% 68,0% 68,2% 
Right 33,3% 24,1% 32,0% 31,8% 
Total     9 113 534 907 
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The Netherlands 
Party Name  Stance 
50PLUS R 
Christian Democratic Appeal R 
ChristianUnion R 
Democrats 66 R 
GreenLeft L 
Labour Party L 
Party for Freedom R 
Party for the Animals L 
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy R 
Reformed Political Party R 
Socialist Party L 
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 35,3% 54,4% 33,2% 34,9% 
Right 64,7% 45,6% 66,8% 65,1% 
Total     17 195 2.290 2.502 
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Norway 
Party Name  Stance 
Centre Party  L 
Christian Democratic Party R 
Coastal Party  Rg 
Conservative Party  R 
Green Party  L 
Labour Party  L 
Liberal Party  R 
Progress Party  R 
Socialist Left Party  L 
The Party Red  L 
 
 
     Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 0,0% 49,4% 47,3% 47,6% 
Right 0,0% 50,6% 52,7% 52,4% 
Total     0 332 1.871 2.203 
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Portugal 
Party Name  Stance 
Christian Democracy and Citizenship Party Rc 
Communist Party of the Portuguese Workers / Reorganizative Movement of the 
Portuguese Proletariat 
Lb 
Democratic Party of the Atlantic Lb 
Earth Party R 
FREE/Time to Advance Lc  
Humanist Party Lb 
Left Bloc L 
National Renewal Party Rb 
New Democracy Rb 
People, Animals, Nature La 
Popular Monarchical Party Rh 
Portugal Ahead R 
Republic Democratic Party No votes 
Social Democratic Centre - Popular R 
Social Democratic Party R 
Socialist Party L 
To Act Lc 
Unitarian Democratic Coalition L 
United for the People No votes 
United Party of Retired and Pensioners Missingc 
Us, Citizens Lc 
Workers Party of Socialist Unity Lb 
 
 
   Ancestry  
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 40,0% 52.8% 60,0% 59,2% 
Right 60,0% 47,2% 40,0% 40,8% 
Total     5 125 1.083 1.213 
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Spain 
Party Name  Stance 
Amaiur/Bildu L 
Animalist Party Against Mistreatment of Animals Li 
Basque Nationalist Party R 
Canarian Coalition R 
Canarian Coalition – Communist Party Missing* 
Canarian Coalition / New Canarias R 
Citizens R 
Commitment Lc 
Commitment/We can/United left L 
Compromise EQUO Lb 
Convergence and Union R 
Democratic Convergence of Catalonia/Catalan European Democratic Party Lc 
En Masse L 
Forum of Citizens R 
Galician Nationalist Bloc L 
Gather Lc 
New Canarias L 
People's Party R 
Popular Unity Candidacy Lc 
Republican Left of Catalonia L 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party L 
Together, we can L 
Union, Progress and Democracy R 
United Left L 
United, we can L 
We can L 
Yes to the future R 
* Coalition for independence of right and left party  
 
 
      Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 75,0% 46,8% 49,5% 49,3% 
Right 25,0% 53,2% 50,5% 50,7% 
Total     4 248 1.869 2.121 
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Sweden 
Party Name  Stance 
Center Party R 
Christian-Democrats R 
Environment Party—The Greens L 
Feminist Initative L 
Left Party L 
Liberal People’s Party R 
Moderate Party R 
Pirate Party R 
Social Democratic Party L 
Sweden Democrats R 
 
 
   Ancestry  
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 52,8% 59,9% 47,6% 49,1% 
Right 47,2% 40,1% 52,4% 50,9% 
Total     36 319 2.302 2.657 
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Switzerland 
Party Name  Stance 
Alternative Left Lb 
Bourgeois-Democratic Party/Conservative Democratic Party R 
Christian Democrats/Christian Democratic Party R 
Christian Social Party L 
Evangelical People's Party R 
Federal Democratic Union R 
Green Liberal Party L 
Green Party L 
Movement of the Citizens of French-speaking Switzerland Rb 
Pirate Party Missingf 
Political Womens group No votes 
Radical Liberals/FDP The Liberals R 
Socialist Party/Social Democratic Party L 
Swiss Labour Party L2 
Swiss People Party R 
Ticino League R 
  
 
     Ancestry   
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 41,4% 36,1% 26,8% 28,7% 
Right 58,6% 63,9% 73,2% 71,3% 
Total     29 230 1.076 1.335 
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United Kingdom 
Party Name  Stance 
Conservative Party R 
Green Party L 
Labour Party L 
Liberal Democratic Party L 
Party of Wales L 
Scottish National Party L 
United Kingdom Independence Party R 
Alliance Party (nir) Ld 
Democratic Unionist Party (nir) Rd 
Green Party (nir) No votes 
Independent(s) (nir) Missing 
People Before Profit Alliance (nir) No votes 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (nir) Ld 
Traditional Unionist Party (nir) Rc 
Ulster Unionist Party (nir) Rd 
We Ourselves/Sinn Féin (nir) Ld 
 
 
   Ancestry  
   CEE Other immigrant Native Total 
Party voted for 
Left 67,7% 69,0% 50,5% 47,6% 
Right 32,3% 31,0% 49,5% 52,4% 
Total     31 374 2.166 2.571 
 
